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Leveling the Playing Field: A New Theory of
Exclusion for a Post-PATRIOT Act America
Christian Halliburton *
For almost half a century, courts have been going about their constitu-
tionally delegated business of enforcing the Fourth Amendment's guarantees'
in a fundamentally misguided fashion. It would not be fair to say that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence lacks any internal consistency. Rather, the deci-
sion of whether to suppress unlawfully collected evidence in a criminal case
has long been guided by a policy not derived from, and ultimately incompati-
ble with, the Fourth Amendment itself. Yet the Supreme Court is never just
deciding a particular Fourth Amendment case or determining whether evi-
dence offered against a specific defendant should be excluded; it is also tell-
ing a tale about constitutional meaning and the price of noncompliance. This
narrative woven around the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule has taken
a crooked course that significantly impedes the liberty-preserving function of
the Amendment itself. The trend has even gone so far as to spawn new legis-
lation that may portend the end for this portion of the Bill of Rights.
While it has been said that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
is reasonableness," 2 in its purest form the Fourth Amendment requires every
search or seizure to be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable
cause.3 Although there are many recognized exceptions to this "warrant pref-
erence," largely premised on the need for law enforcement flexibility,4 the
* Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like
to thank all those who supported this effort, including the Deans of his home institu-
tion and the editorial board of the Missouri Law Review. The author wishes to express
particular gratitude to Professor John Mitchell for his inexhaustible energy and flow
of inspiration, and to Professor Janet Ainsworth for her expert guidance in developing
these ideas. The Article would not have been possible without the constructive hospi-
tality shown by the participants at numerous gatherings, not least of all those at the St.
Louis University School of Law's faculty workshop series, nor without the priceless
insights offered by Professors Francisco Vald~s, Camille Nelson, Frank Rudy Cooper,
and Emily Houh during its development. The deepest appreciation is owed to Jason
Schwarz, whose agile and indefatigable research assistance defied all superlatives.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).
3. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
4. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that as of 1991 there were twenty-two exceptions to the warrant requirement
(citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1473-74 (1985)); George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide:
Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REv.
145, 169 (2001) ("Today, roughly twenty-four exceptions to this 'warrant require-
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law has not dispensed with the probable cause requirement. Thus, before they
can interfere with an individual's liberty, agents of the law must possess spe-
cific facts and information that would cause a person of reasonable caution to
believe that criminal activity has been or is about to be committed. 5 More-
over, the suspicion of illegal conduct must be particularized to an individual
or a discrete group of specific individuals-generalized suspicion will not
justify intrusion into the Fourth Amendment's protected sphere.
6
A corollary of the Fourth Amendment's two interactive decrees, requir-
ing reasonableness in police procedures and that warrants be issued pursuant
to a showing of probable cause, is that evidence collected contrary to these
provisions cannot be used against the accused at any subsequent criminal
prosecution. This exclusionary rule was originally recognized as flowing
from the Fourth Amendment directly (even though it is nowhere mentioned in
the text), and the logical force of coupling a remedy to the constitutional right
is compelling.
The rule of evidentiary exclusion, while certainly of constitutional ori-
gin, has been treated as if founded upon one of several justifications at once.
On one hand, the early Court indicated that admitting evidence derived from
Fourth Amendment violations would impermissibly compromise the integrity
of the judicial system by derogating from the tribunal's own commitment to
constitutional commands. At the same time, however, the Court determined
that evidentiary exclusion was necessary to remedy the profound personal
harm inflicted by Fourth Amendment violations. While the notion of judicial
integrity and this nascent remedial theory of exclusion appear to be consis-
tent, early courts tended to emphasize the remedial aspect of the rule as being
its raison d'etre, notwithstanding the benefits the rule had on the dignity of
the judiciary.
However, even after the exclusionary rule was announced as a compo-
nent of the Fourth Amendment's guarantees, it remained unclear whether the
rule should be applied beyond the federal system. It took forty-seven years
for the Supreme Court to settle the incorporation debate and conclude that the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should constrain state officials per
force of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Perhaps related to this search for scope,
the Court was also grappling with the question of why it should apply the
exclusionary rule at all.
Over time, and without explicit warning, the Court shifted focus from
the principles of remedy and integrity to a deterrence rationale. According to
ment' exist, discovered by the Court largely in cases coming from state courts."). See
also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (automobile exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298 (1967) (hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (exigent
circumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (mobile containers).
5. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
6. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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this justification for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, evidence col-
lected by unlawful means was to be suppressed at a subsequent criminal
prosecution if, and only if, doing so would deter future instances of undesir-
able law enforcement conduct. Although the shift from a remedial to a deter-
rence rationale for evidentiary exclusion under the Fourth Amendment was
achieved by subtle means, there is no understating the significance of the
move.
Indeed, the decision to pursue deterrence goals rather than provide a
remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights had a profound effect on
the subsequent development of the exclusionary rule. Perhaps due to the logi-
cal structure of the deterrence model, this shift set the stage for the recogni-
tion of several important exceptions to the exclusionary rule that represent
fundamental compromises in the protection or relief exclusion might offer the
accused.8
More recently, and perhaps less predictably, it has become clear that the
Court's steady migration towards a deterrence rationale of exclusion-an
instance of what I call interbranch locution-is conceptually integral to a
deeper paradigm shift in American criminal procedure: the rejection of prob-
able cause as the fundamental prerequisite for incursions on individual lib-
erty. Interbranch locution is a way of describing how the Court, through its
decisions, educates the other branches of government on constitutional values
and provides cues as to the areas in which its demand for constitutional com-
pliance will be less stringent.
By way of example, according to the USA PATRIOT Act, law enforce-
ment agencies no longer need to demonstrate probable cause, or even the
less-onerous "articulable suspicion," 9 to justify infringing on our protected
spaces; nor need they inform those whose privacy has been invaded of the
fact of the invasion. By reducing the level of suspicion required for a consti-
tutional search or seizure, the Act alters the central balance between the gov-
ernment's authority to detect and punish wrongdoing and the public's basic
right to be left alone, and purports to allow official conduct previously de-
clared beyond the boundaries imposed by the Fourth Amendment. This Arti-
cle takes the position that, although the PATRIOT Act is superficially unre-
lated to the specifics of the exclusionary rule, such a drastic departure from
constitutional norms would not have been possible had the Court not condi-
tioned the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule's operation on pursuit of the
inherently unstable target of institutional deterrence.
Part I of this Article will trace the development of the Fourth Amend-
ment's exclusionary rule from its origins in federal court through its incorpo-
ration against the states, paying particular attention to the underlying purpose
of the exclusionary rule as announced by the Court, and concluding with a
survey of several exceptions to the exclusionary rule derived from that pur-
8. See infra Part D.
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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pose. Part II will discuss aspects of the PATRIOT Act that are facially incon-
sistent with clearly established Fourth Amendment law, describe the opera-
tional relationship between the shift to a deterrence model of evidence exclu-
sion and the Act's passage, and identify the criminological assumptions on
which the Act is based. Part III of this Article argues that the wrong turn
made in the area of evidentiary exclusion fifty years ago, problematic as it has
always been, must now share the blame for a loss of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection enjoyed by the American public as a whole. I conclude by suggesting
that the single solution is to restore the remedial vision of the Fourth
Amendment through interpretation of the exclusionary rule.
I. EVOLUTION OF EXCLUSION
A. Foundations of Fourth Amendment Freedom
The text of the Fourth Amendment, by itself, does not provide a high
degree of guidance as to the limitations it imposes on law enforcement con-
duct. 0 In one glorious run-on sentence the Framers promised us that
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 1"
Embedded in that lyric are two distinct entitlements. First, we have the over-
arching right to be free from unreasonable invasions of our bodies, houses,
papers, and effects. This provision expressly grants a fundamental measure of
privacy and security to tangible forms and objects, and that same sphere of
protection was later recognized as extending to intangible items such as oral
communications.' 2 It is also noteworthy that this is the only place where rea-
sonableness, an inherently flexible and relative notion, is included in our na-
tion's fundamental legal code.'
3
10. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment does not expressly mention, and is therefore
not necessarily limited in application to, agents exercising criminal as opposed to civil
authority. For an exploration of the significance of the Fourth Amendment's textual
breadth, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1994).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
13. Some scholars have argued that reasonableness is, in fact, the overarching
guideline to be observed when understanding the Fourth Amendment's true operation.
Instead of being bound by fixed markers such as the presence of a warrant, or the
possession of "fixed, easily knowable" probable cause, the limits imposed by the
[Vol. 70
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Additionally, we are guaranteed that no warrants shall issue unless they
are supported by probable cause and particularly describe the objects of the
search or seizure. Despite this seemingly clear language, the United States
Supreme Court did not declare until 1948 that this provision created a "war-
rant preference" governing the course of criminal investigations.14 Justice
Jackson brought the warrant preference to life in the case of Ms. Anne John-
son, who was convicted of narcotics charges after officers executed a war-
rantless entry and search of her Seattle hotel room. 15 The Seattle Police De-
partment had initially been led to Ms. Johnson by a confidential informant,
known by the police to be an active drug addict, who told them that "un-
known persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel."' 16 Seattle Detective
Belland visited the hotel with the informant, and testified that he detected the
odor of burning opium coming from the hotel's Room 1.17 Detective Belland
contacted and was later joined by federal narcotics agents, and together they
demanded entry into Room I where Ms. Johnson was staying.'8 There they
engaged in a complete search of the hotel room that revealed incriminating
narcotics paraphernalia.' 9
Justice Jackson recognized that the Fourth Amendment's protections re-
quire that probable cause determinations which lead to constitutional events
should ordinarily be made by a neutral and detached magistrate during a war-
rant application process; to do otherwise would leave the security of citizens
in the discretion of officers employed in the "competitive enterprise of ferret-
ing out crime.,,20 Indeed, interposing the magistrate between the law en-
Fourth Amendment on official behavior are essentially reduced to a reasonableness
consideration, "factoring in the degree of the intrusion and the gravity of the investi-
gated offense." See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 951, 956 (2003).
14. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).





20. See id. at 13-14 ("The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.").
History appears to support this reading of the Fourth Amendment. For example,
commentators have suggested that the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause was writ-
ten in response to, and in order to prevent, the use of general writs of assistance as a
means of regulating law enforcement interactions with the public. Writs of assistance
were a general command that the person named in the writ submit to the authority of
an officer in possession of such a writ, and authorized this interference without any
substantial showing that the individual had engaged in criminal behavior. Perhaps not
2005]
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forcement officer's suspicions and the individual's entitlement to a presump-
tion of innocence strikes the balance between the rights of the person and the
powers of the government. "Any assumption that evidence sufficient to sup-
port a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will
justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the dis-
cretion of police officers."
2
'
Despite their importance to the functioning of the criminal justice sys-
tem, the content of warrants issued by judicial officers is now one of the least
common subjects of judicial analysis under the Fourth Amendment. Instead,
courts focus on such thorny questions as whether probable cause to arrest is
established by running from law enforcement, 22 whether an anonymous tip
that someone is carrying a gun is enough to justify a search of that person,
23
and whether thermal imaging is a permissible way to detect unlawful drug-
related activity. 24 One could fairly ask how we got to the point where the
standards governing the necessary content of properly issued search warrants
have become so seemingly unimportant.
25
unpredictably, writs of assistance quickly became a way for authorities to suppress
communicative activities and quiet political dissent. See generally JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30-48 (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 51-105 (1970); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary
Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 572 (1983); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-
and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1983).
The warrant preference recognized in Johnson is also favorably supported by the
legislative history of the Fourth Amendment itself. It is important in this regard to
consider that warrantless searches were apparently so uncommon in Colonial times
that Madison's first draft of the Fourth Amendment only referred to unreasonable
searches and seizures as a function of invalid warrants. This may suggest that war-
rantless law enforcement intrusions were simply not a creature of colonial police
practices, and therefore not a concern that required explicit protections. See, e.g.,
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 600-04 (1999). But see Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 218-23 (1993).
21. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
22. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
23. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
24. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
25. Indeed, several scholars have capably addressed possible causes of skepti-
cism regarding judicial review of warrant applications and supporting affidavits. See,
e.g., Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986); Abraham S. Gold-
stein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1173 (1987); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA.




Interestingly, one of the earliest Supreme Court cases interpreting the
Fourth Amendment did not actually involve any sort of exclusionary principle
in a criminal case. Instead, the Court was asked to consider how, if at all, the
Fourth Amendment affects the government's power to demand the production
of certain documents in a civil forfeiture proceeding. In essence, it was a dis-
covery dispute. In the 1886 case Boyd v. United States,26 the Court analyzed a
federal statute that conferred on the government's trial counsel the right to a
court order directing inspection of a defendant's relevant papers; the penalty
for refusal was that all of the government's allegations would be taken as
true. 27 In an opinion that provides a probable starting point for Fourth
Amendment analysis, the Boyd Court found the challenged statute to be un-
constitutional under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 28
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the Court (which, arguably, was
closer in time and thus more aware of the spirit of the Amendments) recog-
nized that the statute operated to provide the government access to Boyd's
private papers in an unreasonable manner. After reviewing the historical prac-
tices engaged in by English and Colonial authorities as explanatory of what
was meant by the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures," the Boyd
court opined that "[i]t is not the breaking of [a person's] doors, and the rum-
maging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense" against the
Constitution, but "the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property . . . this sacred right." 29 More impor-
tantly, and perhaps presciently, the Court warned against subtle encroach-
ments on the right secured by the Fourth Amendment, for it would be in this
manner that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-ing. ',30
After the expansive language employed in Boyd, the Court's first serious
treatment of an exclusionary question in a criminal setting was not very in-
spiring. In 1904, the Supreme Court reviewed petitioner Albert Adams's con-
viction for possession of certain gambling paraphernalia allegedly used in a
numbers game called "policy." 31 In the course of his prosecution, the trial
court permitted the state to introduce other, non-criminal documents in order
to prove Adams's possession and ownership of the policy slips.32 Adams's
Fourth Amendment challenge stemmed from the fact that the search warrant
26. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
27. Id. at 619-20.
28. Id. at 632-33.
29. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 635. It is this last notion which may put the remainder of this discus-
sion into its proper relief.
31. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
32. Id. at 594.
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authorizing the inspection of his apartment did not extend to the search for or
seizure of those other private papers not qualifying as gambling parapherna-
lia.33 There seemed to be no dispute that the scope of the search warrant was
exceeded by the officers who executed it, and that the search and seizure of
Adams's property was therefore unlawful. However, after reviewing Ameri-
can and English precedent together with Greenleaf's treatise, the Adams
Court concluded that, so long as the evidence put before the trial court tended
to establish the guilt of the defendant below, then even if the illegality of the
collection of that evidence is conceded, the Court need not trouble itself with
the means of collection and no objection to admissibility could properly be
raised.
While this conclusion may at first seem out of step with Boyd, the Ad-
ams Court was actually carving out, or at least laying the foundation for, one
of several important exceptions to an exclusionary rule that had yet to be
squarely announced. 35 Thus, the key question in Adams was, "Were the pa-
pers found in the execution of the search warrant, which had a legal purpose
in the attempt to find gambling paraphernalia, competent evidence against the
accused? ' 36 The key conclusion to be taken from Adams is that evidence dis-
covered incident to the execution of a valid search warrant, although not
within the enumerated scope of the search warrant, is not inadmissible if that
evidence is inadvertently and legitimately encountered by the officers execut-
ing the warrant.37 That crucial exception continued to gain strength and is
now well known as the plain view doctrine.
38
In the course of its decision, the Adams Court was careful to distinguish
its case from Boyd, and relied heavily both on the legal justification for the
search, in the form of the search warrant, and the plain view discovery of the
33. Id. at 595-96. This, Adams argued, failed to comply with the Fourth
Amendment requirement that any warrant approved particularly describe the contra-
band nature of the item to be seized. Id.
34. Id. at 594-96.
35. The first, stated only a little bluntly, might be that unlawfully collected evi-
dence is admissible so long as it aids the prosecution in tending to show the guilt of
the accused. Indeed, Justice Day saw the issue as arising "upon objection to the intro-
duction of testimony clearly competent as tending to establish the guilt of the ac-
cused." Id. at 594. Justice Day opined that "[iln such cases the weight of authority as
well as reason limits the inquiry to the competency of the proffered testimony." Id.
No commentator could be cynical enough to say this about today's body of
criminal procedure doctrine, but the Adams Court did not appear to be shy about ex-
pressing this view, stating that even "'[i]f the search warrant were illegal, or if the
officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority ... this is no good reason for ex-
cluding the papers seized as evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue."' Id. at 595
(discussing Greenleaf Vol. 1 § 254a, and quoting Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass.
329, 337 (1841)).
36. Id. at 597.
37. Id. at 595.
38. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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non-contraband evidence relating to Adams's gambling activity. These fac-
tors notwithstanding, the Adams Court did recognize that the Fourth Amend-
ment represents a constitutional guarantee of a certain measure of privacy and
security, and that it was adopted to provide a remedy for times when that pri-
vacy or security is violated. Indeed,
[t]he security intended to be guaranteed by the 4th Amendment
against wrongful search and seizures is designed to prevent viola-
tions of private security in person and property and unlawful inva-
sion of the sanctity of the home by officers of the law ... and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.40
C. A Theory of Exclusion Coalesces
From Adams's encouraging statements and less encouraging results, it
took only ten years for the Court to depart from the Adams line of precedent
and declare that the basis for excluding evidence collected contrary to the
Fourth Amendment's restrictions was an inherent aspect of the Amendment
itself. In 1914, Justice Day, who wrote Adams, was confronted with another
conviction for running numbers in Weeks v. United States.4 1 This time, poorMr. Fremont Weeks was convicted on the basis of evidence unlawfully col-
lected by local and federal agents in the undisputed absence of a warrant.42
After again reviewing the same historical evils associated with general war-
rants and writs of assistance that drove the Framers, the Weeks Court began
its analysis with Boyd's spirit and Adams's "exceptions." It then announcedfor the first time that if evidence can be unlawfully seized and used against
the accused, "the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment, declaring his right to
be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion.' ' 43 Justice Day continued: "The efforts of the courts and their officials tobring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aidedby the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land.""
As if this weren't enough, the Weeks Court made two additional pro-
nouncements that deserve particular attention. First, the Court emphasized, in
an eminently humane fashion, that the Fourth Amendment's protection
reaches "all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to
39. Adams, 192 U.S. at 598.
40. Id.
41. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. Id. at 386.
43. Id. at 393.
44. Id.
2005)
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it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system
with the enforcement of the laws. '45 The obligation to respect boundaries
imposed by the Bill of Rights, Justice Day instructed, reaches every person
and level of the federal system.
46
Perhaps more significant was the Weeks Court's decision that the Fourth
Amendment imposed no restriction on what state-authorized officers, unaided
by their federal counterparts could do, nor limited what evidence could be
admitted in a state criminal court proceeding.47 The Weeks Court thereby
established what essentially became two parallel systems for regulating law
enforcement conduct: one system governed by the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights that affected federal actors and influenced evidence at federal trials,
and a separate system governed by the rules of evidence and criminal proce-
dure of each of the fifty states that controlled the conduct of state actors and
impacted state prosecutions. Thus, by 1920 (when the Court decided Silver-
thorne Lumber), it was well-established that, at least with respect to federal
actions, "[t]he essence of [the] provision forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way" is that such evidence cannot subsequently be used in
court-for to allow otherwise is to "reduce[] the Fourth Amendment to a
form of words."4s At the same time, the Fourth Amendment provided no pro-
tection against unlawful evidence collection or other violations of privacy by
the state.49
Picking up on the thread loosened by Weeks, many state courts simply
declined to follow Weeks or to adopt a similar exclusionary rule.
50 Typical of
this trend, (then) Judge Cardozo explicitly rejected Weeks's reasoning in the
1926 case of People v. Defore.51 The law could not tolerate, Justice Cardozo
wrote, a rule that allowed a criminal to go free simply because the constable
45. Id. at 392.
46. This would obviously include all three of the coordinate branches of gov-
ernment. The fight over whether this obligation would be similarly imposed upon
actors of state agencies would wait for another day. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), discussed infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text, and Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)),
47. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
48. Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
49. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
50. Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 138 N.E. 11 (Mass. 1923);
Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 141 N.E. 500 (Mass. 1923)); California (People v.
Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 (1922), overruled in part by People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905
(Cal. 1955), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Daan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984)); Connecticut (State v. Reynolds, 125 A. 636 (Conn. 1924));
Ohio (Rosanski v. State, 140 N.E. 370 (Ohio 1922)); Kansas (State v. Johnson, 226 P.
245 (Kan. 1924)); Iowa (State v. Rowley, 195 N.W. 881 (Iowa 1923)); Virginia (Hall
v. Commonwealth, 121 S.E. 154 (Va. 1924)); and South Dakota (City of Sioux Falls
v. Walser, 187 N.W. 821 (S.D. 1922)).
51. 150N.E. 585 (1926).
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blundered in the course of his apprehension.5 2 The Defore court also rejected
the federal rule, in part, precisely on account of its inconsistent application to
state versus federal actors. 53 Because it saw no merit in a rule so schizo-
phrenic, New York sided with the majority of states and explicitly rejected
the Weeks rule.54 Most interestingly, the Defore court justified its result by
noting the availability of other civil remedies for the invasion of Fourth
Amendment rights which it found satisfactory.
Surprisingly, this condition where state and federal agents were bound
by different rules lasted nearly four more decades, until the Supreme Court
finally found the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule binding on the states
in the landmark 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio.56 Mapp involved an obscenity
possession conviction which was based on evidence collected by local law
enforcement officers' strong-arm tactics and a sham warrant that was, most
likely, a blank sheet of paper.57 The Mapp Court's extensive historical analy-
sis led it to undo a troubling decision rendered twelve years earlier in Wolfv.
Colorado. In Wolf, the Supreme Court held that the privacy rights protected
by the Fourth Amendment were made applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but the exclusionary rule was not implicit in the Due
Process concept of "ordered liberty" and therefore did not affect state law
enforcement action.
59
The Mapp decision closed the door on this less-than-logical Fourteenth
Amendment distinction, a change in perspective so deep that it might only be
explained by the addition of six new faces on the bench during those inter-
52. Id. at 587-88. This is consistent with the type of analysis adopted in Adams.
See supra notes 31-40.
53. Defore, 150 N.E. at 588.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 586-87. For an argument that civil remedies should, in fact, supplant
the remedy of evidentiary exclusion, see Amar, supra note 10. Professor Amar argues
more broadly that the modem body of Fourth Amendment decisions results from a
misreading of the text itself. Id. While there are very real restrictions imposed by thisportion of the Bill of Rights, Professor Amar argues that none of them imposes an
absolute warrant requirement, makes probable cause an essential ingredient to permis-
sible law enforcement encounters, or applies strictly to criminal investigations and
actors. Id.
For purposes of this discussion, it is not important to pursue the significance ofthe Court's reference to civil remedies any further than to emphasize the mentality it
reveals: that violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment freedoms represents alegally cognizable injury. From that point of analysis the need for a remedy of some
sort, particular to the individual, is brought into focus.
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. Id. at 644-45. No warrant was ever produced at Mapp's trial. Id. at 645.58. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
59. Id. at 26-27.
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vening twelve years.60 In some of the strongest language justifying exclusion
written by that time, the Mapp court referred to the admission of unconstitu-
tionally collected evidence as a most "flagrant abuse of [a] basic right," and
noted that relegating the Fourth Amendment's guarantees to remedies other
than exclusion would be a futile undertaking.6 1 Not only is the admission of
evidence collected contrary to the Fourth Amendment a flagrant abuse of
sacred rights, Mapp recognized that viewing the exclusionary rule as a reme-
dial element of the Fourth Amendment "makes very good sense."
62 For those
manifest reasons, the Court declared that evidence collected contrary to the
Fourth Amendment shall not be used against the accused in her criminal
prosecution.
Despite such heartwarming language, the days were numbered for this
conception of the Fourth Amendment embodied in Mapp. Indeed, the same
Court may have hastened its demise a year earlier in Elkins 
v. United States.63
There, the Court stated that one of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule was "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty . . . by removing the incentive to disregard it." 64 Unfortunately,
subsequent tribunals took this deterrence language, which may simply be a
nod to an attractive function of the remedial exclusion of evidence, and
treated it as the sole motivating force behind application of the exclusionary
rule. This inordinate focus on deterrence extracted the remedial theory from
the evidentiary exclusion inquiry.
There is, however, another way to understand the Court's treatment of
the issue in Elkins. There is no doubt that the theme of deterrence figures
prominently in the Court's opinion. Yet this need not, and should not, lead to
the conclusion that deterring institutional actors from engaging in future con-
stitutional violations, as opposed to making whole one who suffers such a
violation, is the sole reason for applying the exclusionary rule to a given piece
of challenged evidence.
Indeed, there are circumstances under which it is perfectly appropriate
for a court to discuss the institutional deterrent value of a remedial exclusion-
ary rule. The question presented in Elkins was whether the Fourth Amend-
ment forbade the admission in federal court of evidence unconstitutionally
collected by state actors. 65 In deciding to close this preexisting loophole, fre-
60. For a fuller discussion of this shift in personnel, and of the changing faces of
the Supreme Court generally, see 2 DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT, 903-1022 (4th ed. 2004).
61. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55.
62. Id. at 657.
63. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
64. Id. at 217.
65. Id. at 208.
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66.quently referred to as the silver platter doctrine, it was necessary for theCourt to indicate that, where state actors intentionally seek to circumvent the
rulings and authority of the federal judicial system, such strategic behavior
must itself be deterred. Where its own authority and ability to effectively
supervise the American law enforcement complex is challenged, the Court
must penalize such efforts with the most effective sanction-exclusion. 67
Thus, far from laying the foundation for a "new" theory of exclusion
based on deterrence models, Elkins suggests that the Court will rely on the
remedial exclusionary rule in order to ensure that officers do not seek to do an
"end run" around the guidelines the Court must establish. The larger issue at
stake in Elkins, given that the violation of Elkins' Fourth Amendment rights
was essentially conceded by the time the case reached the Court, was not
merely one of individual rights vindication, but a more comprehensive chal-lenge to the Court's ability to invoke its supervisory authority.68 In this case,
the conflict was as much between the state's executive authority and the su-premacy of the Supreme Court on questions of constitutional compliance as it
was about the state overbearing upon the individual defendant.
In this regard, Elkins is better understood in the light cast by the Court's
more recent decisions on the extent to which Miranda rights might be com-
promised by strategic law enforcement misbehavior. Missouri v. Seibert6 9
presented the Court with an opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of apolice technique known as "question-first" in which officers interrogating a
suspect would purposely withhold Miranda warnings until incriminating
statements or a confession could be elicited. 70 The officers would then recite
the warnings required by Miranda "midstream" in the interrogation, and pro-
ceed to repeat their earlier questioning until the inculpatory statement or con-
fession is likewise repeated. 71 "The object of question-first is to renderMiranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to
66. This practice of using illegally collected evidence gathered by state-
empowered actors in federal court was first dubbed the "silver platter doctrine" inLustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
67. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221 ("[E]ven more is to be said for adoption of the exclu-
sionary rule in the particular context here presented-a context which brings intofocus considerations of federalism. The very essence of a healthy federalism depends
upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts.").
68. Id. at 216 ("What is here invoked is the Court's supervisory power over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which the Court has
'from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied infederal criminal prosecutions."') (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
341 (1943)).
69. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
70. Id. at 2606.
71. Id.
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give them, after the suspect has already confessed. ' '72 Although the extent to
which this technique was employed throughout the country was not readily
discemable,73 the Court in Seibert noted that practitioners of this technique
employed it precisely because it was devastatingly effective in achieving "its
manifest purpose, which is to get a confession the suspect would not make if
he understood his rights at the outset." 74
The Seibert Court recognized the question-first "protocol
7 5 to be pre-
cisely what it is: "a police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warn-
ings., 76 The intentional omission of Miranda warnings was found to be a
deliberate effort "designed to circumvent" the constitutional protection that
case provides,77 an "end-run" around the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. Quite rightly, the Seibert Court refused to allow
"[s]trategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda [to] accom-
plish by training instructions what Dickerson78 held Congress could not do by
statute. ' 79 It ordered suppression of both the pre-warning and post-warning
statements in order to ensure that the judicial system's ability to enforce the
constitutional commands of Miranda was not frustrated.
Although the Court did not confront precisely the same technique in El-
kins as it did with the question-first protocol in Seibert, the silver platter doc-
trine embodied no less a deliberate effort to thwart the effectiveness and
symbolic significance of the Fourth Amendment. Under these circumstances
72. Id. at 2610. The interrogating officer "testified that he made a 'conscious
decision' to withhold Miranda warnings, thus resorting to an interrogation technique
he had been taught: question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the ques-
tion 'until I get the answer that she's already provided once."' Id. at 2606.
73. That said, the Court also had no doubt that the question-first practice "is not
confined to Rolla, Missouri" (the jurisdiction which investigated and prosecuted Re-
spondent Patrice Seibert), and provided a litany of law enforcement training materials
that expressly taught and encouraged use of the question-first technique and other
behaviors that ignore Miranda's dictates. Id. at 2608-09. That these sorts of system-
atic protocols, designed to undermine the purpose of Miranda and defeat the efficacy
of its rule, were being integrated into departmental policy seemed to give the Court
particular cause for concern. See id. at 2608-09 & n.3.
74. Id. at 2610-11.
75. Id. at 2605.
76. Id. at 2 61 2 .
77. See id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the question-first pro-
tocol both "undermines the Miranda warning and obscures its meaning").
78. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Dickerson represents
the Court's latest, and likely final, word on whether the Miranda rule is of constitu-
tional character, or is merely a judicially crafted safeguard ancillary to the Fifth
Amendment. The Court reached the former conclusion in a case that required it to
pass on the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, by which Congress attempted to restore the
pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances test" as the basis for testing the admissibil-
ity of confessions in federal court. Id. at 436-37.
79. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (footnote not in original).
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some attention to deterrence makes sense: what these recent discussions show
is that courts will, and should, suppress evidence collected by methods that
are designed to short-circuit the practical benefit of the constitutional protec-
tions afforded to the accused 80 The Seibert Court indicated, as did its prede-
cessor tribunal in Elkins, that faithful and not merely nominal compliance
with the Court's constitutional pronouncements will be demanded perforce
of the exclusionary rule. The fact that such exclusion vindicates the individ-
ual's constitutional rights is the underlying, true purpose of this rule which
can, at times, simultaneously ensure that the Court's supervisory authority is
respected.
But this wisdom was lost on the Court that heard Franks v. Delaware.8 '
There, the Court had to decide whether a defendant could ever peer behind
the face of a judicially-approved search warrant and scrutinize the contents of
the supporting law enforcement affidavits for material misstatements and
untruths. Apparently swayed (and confused) by the language of deterrence
used in earlier decisions, the Franks Court held that a defendant has the right
to challenge the veracity and sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit, and
thus potentially present a claim of invalidity that would lead to exclusion,
only if she can make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
or inaccurate information was purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly used in
support of the search warrant request; a claim of unwitting or unintentional
inclusion of false information would not suffice.82 The Franks Court was
clearly applying a solely deterrence-based exclusionary rule by singling out
deliberate and reckless falsification.8 3 Given that unintentional abuses of the
80. It is of course true that, with respect to the exclusionary rule, "'unreasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation
under the Fifth Amendment' and that, "unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule, the 'Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."' Id. at 2616-17 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (quoting, in order, Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 306 (1985)) (alteration in original). These realities do not, however, indicate that
a deliberate end-run around a Fourth Amendment standard is any less reprehensible-
indeed, given the types of behavior tolerated in the Miranda arena, see, e.g., Elstad,
470 U.S. at 309 (permitting unwarned incriminating statements to be used against the
accused where the failure to warn was unintentional, "unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exer-
cise his free will"); United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (refusing to sup-press physical evidence discovered as a result of an unwarned, and therefore inadmis-
sible, confession obtained outside the presence of counsel), it may be fair to say thatdeliberate strategies designed to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's protections are
even more compelling bases for judicial rebuke through the exclusion of evidence.
81. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
82. Id. at 171.
83. Id. at 169 (observing that allowing impeachment of the search warrant affi-davit, under the proper circumstances, is necessary because the magistrate's initial
review "not always will suffice to discourage lawless or reckless misconduct").
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search warrant process cannot, by definition, be deterred, the Franks Court
completed the shift from remedy to deterrence without realizing how far out
of step it was with the primary purpose of the rule at its inception. It was this
decision that took the concept of deterrence out of the appropriate, but lim-
ited, context suggested by Elkins, and which got our precious exclusionary
rule so off track.
Thus, by 1978 (when the Court decided Franks) there was no longer any
hint of a true remedial spirit in the Court's opinion, but this is only a reflec-
tion of the Franks Court's out-of-context reliance on the language of deter-
rence without importing any of the Elkins decision's imbedded wisdom. El-
kins may fairly be read as suggesting that the deterrence of constitutional
violations is not the end of the exclusionary rule. Instead it is the means by
which the exclusionary rule prospectively serves the ultimate end of protect-
ing and preserving individual liberty. The Franks Court relied on this deter-
rence-only conception of exclusion as a basis for the outcome of a case that
would have been more properly focused on the judiciary's constitutional ob-
ligation to restore the balance between the state and the accused.
D. Exceptions Gone Wild
This distorted emphasis on deterrence gave birth to an odd facet of
Fourth Amendment law illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Leon.84 In ruling on a challenge to Leon's conviction on narcotics
trafficking charges, Justice White crafted a "good faith" exception to the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule which allows the use of unlawfully col-
lected evidence in cases where officers act in reasonable reliance on a judicial
search warrant subsequently determined to be invalid.
8 5 Leon involved a lit-
any of evidence, including extensive surveillance and detailed confidential
informant testimony, which was collected by a seasoned officer over a sub-
stantial period.86 That officer prepared a lengthy affidavit and search warrant
application, and even took the time to have his application reviewed by sev-
eral members of the district attorney's office before presenting it to a Califor-
nia Superior Court judge.87 The superior court in turn approved a search war-
rant for several residences and automobiles that were linked to Leon, leading
to a seizure of contraband narcotics. 88 Under these circumstances, there was
no doubt about the good faith of the officers who investigated this case, both
prior to and including the execution of the search warrant.
Nevertheless, the California district court concluded prior to Leon's trial
that the search warrant affidavit suffered from fatal defects and was insuffi-
84. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 901-02.




cient to authorize the search that ensued. 89 Specifically, the trial court con-
cluded that the application was inadequate to establish the reliability of tips
given by confidential informants and relied on other outdated information,
thus failing to make the required showing of probable cause. 9° This of course
invalidated the only legitimate basis for the intrusion upon Leon's Fourth
Amendment freedoms and required the suppression of much of the evidence
offered against him.9 1 The California Court of Appeals affirmed.92
On certiorari from the California Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
"modified somewhat" the exclusionary rule in order to allow the admission of
the evidence.93 There was no debate on two key questions in the minds of the
majority. First, the Court left undisturbed the lower courts' rulings that the
search warrant had been improperly issued.94 Second, the Court found unim-
peachable the good faith of the officers involved. 95 In the face of these con-
flicting features of the case, the Court proceeded upon an "evaluation of the
costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers
reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magis-
trate." 96 The Court ultimately concluded that such evidence may be admitted
in the prosecution's case in chief.97
It did not matter that Leon's Fourth Amendment rights had, in fact, been
violated-what was most important was that the Court could "discern no
basis... for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant[would] have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magis-
trate.' '98 Even though it had never before allowed a good faith exception in
the application of Fourth Amendment requirements, the Leon Court used the
rationale of law enforcement deterrence (and its conception of the inherent
limitations of the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect) as a means for narrow-
ing the scope of this constitutional corollary. Thus, instead of being a neces-
sary consequence of the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy, the exclusion-
ary rule was understood in 1984 to be applied 1) on a case-by-case basis, and
2) only in those unusual circumstances where exclusion would 3) deter future
police misconduct.99 In this way, and as the Leon Court was explicitly aware,
89. Id. at 903-04.
90. Id. at 904 n.2.
91. For reasons not germane to this discussion, the Court declined to suppress all
of the unlawfiully collected evidence as to any one of the multiple defendants, in short
for reasons of standing. See id. at 903.
92. Id. at 904.
93. Id. at 905.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 926.
96. Id. at 913.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 916.
99. Id. at 918.
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the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was no longer being treated as "'a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'""°°
More broadly, the deterrence-oriented theory of exclusion became a tool
for carving out still more exceptions to the rule. As the Leon decision demon-
strates, courts could now avoid losing challenged evidence simply by decid-
ing that suppression would not have a direct deterrent effect on the category
of actor who erred. In Leon's case, the constitutional error undisputedly be-
longed to the magistrate judge who approved the challenged search warrant
even though probable cause had not been adequately demonstrated in the
warrant application. Because the Court determined suppression would not
affect the conduct of magistrate judges in similar circumstances, Mr. Leon
was out of luck.101 Moreover, we are told in Leon that the Fourth Amend-
ment's exclusionary rule was meant to "punish" the bad cop, not the bad
judge.10 2 Yet there is no basis in the case law for transforming the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees of privacy, security, and freedom from official in-
terference, into whips specially designed to punish the police. To the extent
that this purely punitive conception of the exclusionary rule (as opposed to
one based on the rule's instrumental value in securing personal freedoms)
flows from Franks's misuse of Elkins's language, it is essential to ask
whether it is still credible to conceive of this constitutional provision in this
fashion.
Not surprisingly, the Leon Court offered no empirical evidence demon-
strating that magistrate judges, as a class, are unconcerned with the outcome
of the cases in which they are involved, or that they lack-any personal in-
vestment in the probable cause and search warrant application decisions they
make. Indeed, the opposite conclusion could easily have been reached if the
Court had assumed the best, rather than the worst, characteristics of magis-
trate judges to be their model of analysis. What does it say about a system
100. Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
This is an unfortunately odd way to characterize an express provision of the Bill of
Rights, that portion of the founding Constitution specifically designed to safeguard
fundamental rights in the new nation.
The Leon Court also seized on the notion expressed in Calandra that "the use of
fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure 'work[s] no new Fourth Amendment
wrong."' Id. (quoting Calandra, 415 U.S. at 354). The important dynamic to observe
here is how the Court uses the limited efficacy of the exclusionary rule as further
argument against its application-a tactic which harkens all the way back to the way
Justice Cardozo's own disdain for the exclusionary rule influenced his opinions on the
matter. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (claiming that "the exclusionary rule is neither
intended nor able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered"' as a reason to enforce the rule not by reference to the injury suffered by the
accused, but rather by reference to its generalized deterrent effect) (quoting Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
101. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17.
102. Id. at 916 (stating that "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police mis-
conduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates").
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purportedly committed to fairness and accuracy if the very people who are
entrusted to make these crucial determinations are construed to be so incau-
tious and divested from the process that they don't care if they make a mis-
take?'0 3
103. While perfectly anecdotal, the author's personal experience with the Federal
District Court and its complement of able magistrate judges flies in the face of the
Leon Court's unseemly suggestion. Nor can the Court's denigration of magistratejudge integrity be rationally limited to those actors. Why not level the same criticism
at all Article III judges, who are appointed to lifetime terms and who are unaccount-
able to the political process? Of course, the answer presents itself as soon as the ques-
tion is formulated: no system ofjustice could effectively operate if its personnel have
no desire, instinct, or incentive towards honesty and truth.
Moreover, at the time the PATRIOT Act was adopted, magistrate judges and otherjudicial officers did not operate without scrutiny, as evidenced by increasingly ag-gressive oversight measures such as the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
End the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
21, 117 Stat. 650. While the PROTECT Act was primarily responsive to the sexual
and other criminal abuse of minors, it carried with it a provision known as the Feeney
Amendment which aggressively restricted the discretion of sentencing courts to de-part downward from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and expressly reserved for
those downward departure decisions the lowest level of deference upon appellate
review. Id. § 401, 117 Stat. at 667 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (Supp. 2002) (held
unconstitutional by United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)). Perhaps most
importantly, the Act as amended empowered the Department of Justice to scrutinize
the records of federal judges, particularly of those it suspected of being too lenient,
and required the Department to provide a yearly report to Congress on the extent to
which the Federal Judiciary was obeying this mandate. Id. § 401(1), 117 Stat. at 674.
The author of the Feeney amendment defended his bill as "a number of provisions
designed to ensure a more faithful adherence to the laws of the United States" byputting "strict limits on [downward] departures for child crimes and sex offenders,"
claiming that "[t]his is important because it limits the judge's discretion, forces thejudge to explain what he has done, and provides for an opportunity for the prosecutors
to appeal if the judge has been completely unfaithful." 149 CONG. REC. H3059,
H3061 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Representative Feeney). More saliently,
the Act "provide[d] for the Department of Justice to have access to [an] existingjudge-identifying database maintained by the [Sentencing] Commission," so that
rogue judges could be brought back in with Congressional and Executive preferences.
Id. (describing this increase in Congressional middle-management of the Judiciary as
"a great victory").
According to House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
the "Feeney Amendment represent[ed] a legislative response to long-standing Con-
gressional concern that the Sentencing Guidelines were increasingly being circum-
vented by some federal judges." 150 CONG. REC. E425, E426 (daily ed. Mar. 23,
2004) (statement by Representative Sensenbrenner to the U.S. Judicial Conference
Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary, expressing per-plexity "as to why such furor has been raised over obtaining records from a judge's
publicly decided cases," suggesting that this is "both Constitutionally authorized and
otherwise appropriate"). To complicate matters, the Chairman thought "it is important
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From Leon's "magistrate judge exception," in which judicial officers are
deemed to be uninfluenced by the deterrent value of evidentiary suppression,
it was a short step to the good faith exception created in 1995 for civilian
employees of criminal justice systems. Thus, in Arizona v. Evans,104 the Su-
preme Court refused to suppress narcotics seized incident to an arrest even
though the arrest was based on a warrant that had been quashed days earlier.
Although the state conceded that the arrest was unlawful because the warrant
had been quashed, 10 5 the Evans Court nevertheless ruled the evidence admis-
sible. Because the clerical employees who allowed the invalid warrant to
persist were neither adjunct to, nor cohorts in, the law enforcement enterprise,
the suppression of evidence based on their mistakes would not likely deter
future improper or careless conduct.'
0 6
Relying on the developing principle that application of the exclusionary
rule is separate from the question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred, the Evans Court had come to view the exclusionary rule as "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of
Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent 
effect."' 0 7
Thus, although the court will still refer to exclusion as a remedy, it is a rem-
edy divorced from its constitutional underpinnings and which is only appro-
priate if justified by its deterrent side effect. And, although Evans remains a
perfectly good statement of the law, it nonetheless represents an endpoint in
the unnatural evolution of the exclusionary rule out of its Fourth Amendment
roots and into a modern, toothless "form of words" whose protections will be
"of no value [to the accused] and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.'
08
to note that Congressional oversight has assumed increased importance because of the
delegated authority currently possessed by the Judiciary to investigate and impose
appropriate discipline upon its members and its decidedly mixed record in this re-
gard." Id. (expressing "profound questions with respect to whether the Judiciary
should continue to enjoy delegated authority to investigate and discipline itself," and
promising that "[i]f the Judiciary will not act, Congress will ...begin assessing
whether the disciplinary authority delegated to the judiciary has been responsibly
exercised and ought to continue").
If the Department of. Justice is actively collecting the name, rank, and serial num-
ber of those judges who are rendering decisions out of step with the Department's
wishes, is it not untenable to suggest that judges will be insensitive to reversals of
their judgment? Again, off-the-record conversations with sitting judges reveal quite
the opposite to be true.
104. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
105. Id. at 6 n.1.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), overruled by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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E. Remedy v. Deterrence: A Study in Contrasts
The differences between a remedial theory of exclusion and a deterrence
theory of exclusion could not be more striking. A remedial theory of exclu-
sion, not surprisingly, is driven by the command that the accused shall not
suffer from the violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, and seeks to re-
store the accused to her status quo ex ante the illegal intrusion. Because this
iteration of the rule is inherently retrospective, and because the "bell" of the
unlawful intrusion itself cannot be "unrung," the only way to cure the harm
occasioned by the unlawful official intrusion is to restore the accused to a
position equal to that which she would have enjoyed but for the intrusion.
The deterrence-driven concept of exclusion is short-hand for the now
well-established notion that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
should be applied with an aim to deter similar constitutional transgressions by
law enforcement actors in the future. Basically, a deterrence-driven exclu-
sionary rule is the constitutional equivalent of making an example out of one
bad apple or, more likely, out of an overzealous but otherwise good apple.
But the deterrence theory is purely prospective, focused on the effect an evi-
dentiary ruling will have on law enforcement at large, and unconcerned about
the effect of the violation on the individual suffering the deprivation.10 9
109. Many have since criticized the Court's reliance on deterrence as a justifica-
tion for exclusion, primarily on the basis that it is unclear whether the rule carries
such an effect. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1976) (stating
that "although scholars have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary rule in
fact does have any deterrent effect, each empirical study on the subject, in its own
way, appears to be flawed"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415-16 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); William C.
Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311,
359 (1991) (stating that "[i]t is arguable . . . that even without exclusion the same
percentage of officers might have indicated that they would have refrained from car-
rying out intrusions they believed to be illegal"); and Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970) (concluding
that the exclusionary rule has no deterrent effect). Critics also note that it is not the
proper role of the courts to be regulators of day-to-day police conduct. See, e.g.,
David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
455, 463 (1999); Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 40,
43 (1982) (saying the officer "lies because he is skeptical of a system that suppresses
truth in the interest of the criminal"). But see Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Offi-
cers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1017 (1987).
While these criticisms are certainly valid, at least in part, they would apply with
equal force but less significance to the remedial model of exclusion. One of the
strengths of applying the exclusionary rule with an eye towards curing a harm of
constitutional dimension is that it has an equal (if not greater) capacity to deter that
conduct to which all society should object. The additional strength of the remedial
theory in this regard is that the deterrent influence is a secondary goal, a side effect of
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This is the paradigm shift that occurred in Fourth Amendment law: a
shift from a rule of exclusion that is concerned about preserving the sanctity
of constitutionally enshrined individual rights, to a system of rights enforce-
ment that is primarily conditioned upon the positive teaching effect which the
exclusion of unlawfully collected evidence may have on future law enforce-
ment actors. 1 0 Indeed, the migration of values illuminated by the cases dis-
cussed herein represents a distortion of the ideals and spirit that originally
animated the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. In the first instance, Ameri-
can courts, which were (and arguably still are) the traditional protectors of a
powerless public against an overreaching government, now decide whether
evidence bearing the taint of constitutional transgression may be used against
a member of that public solely by asking whether exclusion would prevent
future transgressions by agents of the law. Compound that with the fact that
an accused may not even challenge the sufficiency of the magistrate's deci-
sion to approve the warrant that leads to her arrest, and you have fertile soil
from which we can only reap violations of Fourth Amendment privacy and
liberty interests.
i. The Right to a Remedy
The remedial theory of exclusion provides the only complete remedy for
a constitutional violation. One way to understand the Constitution is as a
blueprint for the size and shape of structural relationships. The main body of
the Constitution structures relationships between branches of government,
and between state and federal authorities. The Bill of Rights, no less, struc-
the primary purpose to restore a constitutionally-imposed balance in the relationship
between person and state. The remedial model of evidentiary exclusion thus offers all
of the benefits a deterrence-driven model should offer, and retains all of its logical
force even in the face of well reasoned criticism of the deterrent approach.
110. This shift parallels, and was pivotal to, a larger paradigm shift from a con-
ception of civil liberties as the essential guarantees of a free government and as plac-
ing fundamental limits on law enforcement activities to a conception of those same
civil liberties and of a free public as fundamental obstacles to the eventual develop-
ment of a law enforcement-centered government complex. In future Articles, I will
attempt to develop a framework for understanding this and earlier paradigm shifts in
criminal law, focusing at least initially on tracing the contours of relationship between
the nominal end of the Civil Rights Era, the rise in the American prison population,
and the ongoing "war on drugs." Any effort in this regard would likely begin by ex-
ploring the ways in which criminal laws during Reconstruction, and continuing
through the Jim Crow era of the American South, were used to manage an increas-
ingly bold population of blacks and African Americans. This Article is not meant to
suggest that the transformation of the exclusionary rule treated in the instant discus-
sion is purely a product of race politics in this same way, or to deny that possibility.
What I mean to suggest is future work designed to explore the ways in which water-
shed, paradigmatic shifts in criminal law (and procedure) both respond to, and seek to
direct, fundamental changes in American society.
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tures the relationship between the individual or private communities and the
government as a whole, and any response to a violation of constitutional di-
mension must restore the balance in that structure.
Civil remedies are wholly inadequate to compensate the individual
whose Fourth Amendment rights are compromised. Damages incurred during
the collection of evidence, especially if the law enforcement agents are care-
ful or the investigative activity involves no physical damage, will be at best
nominal in the majority of cases. This leaves the individual with only token
relief, and fails to discourage similar law enforcement behavior in the future.
Moreover, civil damage suits are an expensive proposition unlikely under-
taken by the average criminal defendant, who is already facing the prospects
of civil and criminal sanctions, and unlikely to provide relief to those who
need it most. 1 11
111. There is one alternative civil sanction that has not received the same kind of
attention as have monetary damage actions, but which promises to achieve much of
what those monetary damage actions may not, at least by way of individual law en-
forcement actor's compliance with constitutional regulations. Professor Roger Gold-
man has expressed strong support for the decertification, or "delicensing," of law
enforcement officers found to have violated the Constitution in the course of their
official duties. See Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Offi-
cers' Licenses and Federal Criminal Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative
Federalism, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 121 (2003). The proposal ensures that the
officer receives due process in the course of the revocation, including the right to a
hearing and the assistance of counsel, and proceeds before an administrative lawjudge. Id. The advantages of this proposal are clear: it avoids the cost of a full-blown
civil trial, and does not rely on the ability of the defendant to bring the action; it pro-
vides an official sanction that correlates, intuitively and logically, with the nature of
the offending official conduct; it provides a uniform remedy that will operate with
equal effectiveness for state and federal actors; and it ensures that law enforcement
officers shown to lack sufficient professionalism upon being duly convicted of a con-
stitutional violation cannot practice in the field in another jurisdiction-it weeds out
members of the force who are essentially a liability to both the government and pub-
lic. See also Roger Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative
to Traditional Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45 (1987);
Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Vi-
able Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 541 (2001).
This decertification proposal indeed carries many benefits, and in some senses
may be a viable alternative or supplement to the exclusion of evidence in a criminal
case. The primary limitation of decertification as compared to exclusion is that it
leaves the individual whose rights were compromised out of the equation. To the
extent that this further deemphasizes the personal nature of the injury, it does not
respond to (and may not be designed to respond to) the type of concerns raised in this
Article regarding the purpose of Fourth Amendment regulation by exclusion. And,
while decertification does not entail a separate civil trial, it does require a completely
separate judicial proceeding where matters of fact and law may have to be relitigated
even after resolution at the criminal trial. Exclusionary sanctions (and a remedial
exclusionary sanction, specifically) continue to be available for imposition by trial
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Advocates for civil damage alternatives to remedial exclusion also over-
look the fact that the collection of evidence in an unlawful manner is not the
full extent of the constitutional injury. Instead, the accumulating constitu-
tional injury continues through the use of unlawfully collected evidence at
trial because it creates an uneven "playing field," and distorts the structures
prescribed by the Bill of Rights by giving the government an advantage over
the individual that the rules of the game say it shall not have. Every Fourth
Amendment violation that is not rectified by the suppression of evidence
forces defendants to pay for law enforcement convenience at the price of their
liberty, and tilts the field in favor of the government in a way that ignores the
terms of the very charter that spawned it. The difficulty is that the creation of
a level playing field, or perhaps the definition of what constitutes a balance of
power between the government and the individual, is the only authentic way
to understand the operation of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.
In this sense, the confusion engendered by the migration from remedy to
deterrence obscures the fact that only make-whole relief can compensate an
individual for a violation of her constitutional rights, and that exclusion of
evidence is the only form of make-whole relief that exists. It is well estab-
lished that the first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights 112 represent funda-
mental laws so integral to the American concept of personal freedom as to be
part of the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of liberty expressed in the
Due Process Clause. Given the essential nature of these rights, fidelity to the
meaning of the Constitution requires that the right be coupled with a remedy
for the individual whose dignity and personal freedom are disregarded by
state-empowered law enforcement officers.
ii. The Hidden Costs of Deterrence Modeling
Shadowing the paradigmatic transformation of our criminal procedure
systems that elevated the deterrence theory of exclusion is a more far-
reaching alteration in the fabric of our constitutional democracy and the
meaning of "fundamental" rights. The primary focus of our criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence used to be centered on preventing "bad" actors from doing
"bad" things in violation of the Constitution. This attitude is epitomized by
judges, those best situated to recognize the transgressive nature of complicated law
enforcement activities in the process of trying the action. Simultaneously, the decerti-
fication process should continue to be available to state and federal Police Officer
Standards and Training commissions, as those organizations are best situated to im-
pose license-based disciplinary sanctions and removals of personnel in order to main-
tain the integrity and discipline of the law enforcement industry. It may be, by com-
bining these two approaches, the criminal justice system could best achieve a balance,
rather than compromise, of remedial and deterrent values that may be equally served
by the Fourth Amendment.
112. With few exceptions, such as the right to grand jury indictment and mini-
mum jury size, not relevant to the current discussion.
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the decision in Mapp, which not only highlighted the indefensible rough han-
dling that Ms. Mapp received at the hands of the police but also alluded to the
officers' juvenile attempt to use a sham warrant to violate the protections of
Ms. Mapp's home. Mapp also condemned as incompatible with notions of
freedom and justice the top-to-bottom sacking that occurred. Neither the offi-
cers' demeanor under the circumstances nor their investigative conduct could
be tolerated by a Court unwilling to allow overzealous officers to violate her
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court indicted both the officers' per-
sonal/official value sets and their conduct.
However, with the advent of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, in par-
ticular the role of good faith in cases where the loss of evidence is deemed to
be of no concern to agents of the system, the Court has dispensed with the
conception that those who violate the Constitution are necessarily bad actors.
This variation on the theme is best captured by the Court's language in Leon,
where Justice White states that the question "[w]hether the exclusionary sanc-
tion is appropriately imposed in a particular case . . . is 'an issue separate
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking
to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.""'1 3 "Particularly when
law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgres-
sions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred [by the exclu-
sion of evidence] on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system."' 14 Thus, with the Court's focus on deterrence, we
are told to accept, at least in some instances, that a deprivation of our civil
rights is a good and acceptable practice.
This reduces formerly fundamental constitutional rights to something
less than fundamental. No longer are those who violate the supreme law of
the land considered to be outside the ambit of appropriate social standards,
and their illegal behavior is routinely recharacterized as a technical transgres-
sion. This infects aspects of the Fourth Amendment far beyond questions of
exclusion, as will be shown, and fosters a willingness to eliminate core Fourth
Amendment requirements of probable cause and warrants approved by a neu-
tral and detached magistrate.
f Interbranch Locution:
The Court Speaks, Congress Listens, and America Changes
The process of fixing the boundaries of fundamental law, of divining
constitutional values and direction, has always entailed a sort of conversation
between the branches of government. This interbranch locution clearly has
some aspects of exchange between coequal partners, but there is nevertheless
a dominant voice when it comes to questions of constitutional meaning. The
113. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
426 U.S. 213 (1983)).
114. Id. at 907-08.
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Court instructs and guides its counterpart institutions in their efforts to dis-
charge their own governmental functions. The Court's jurisprudence thus
articulates a narrative that identifies limitations on and trajectories for execu-
tive and legislative conduct. By rejecting or sustaining challenges to any sort
of governmental conduct, but particularly with reference to search and seizure
activity regulated by the Fourth Amendment, the Court informs the legal
community, if not the general public, as to the contours of liberty.
So the limits of both legislative and executive policy designs of all va-
rieties are inherently a reflection, at least in part, of this dynamic. The Court's
constitutional decisions determine the rules of engagement by which these
branches must abide and define the range of strategic approaches they may
permissibly employ. By telling a tale in which the vindication of an individ-
ual's fundamental liberty interest, the right to be let alone and free of unrea-
sonable government intrusion, can be made contingent upon the deterrent
value-a mere side effect-of its remedy, the Court altered the inalienable
status of the right itself and set the stage for incursions by other governmental
branches. The Court told a parable that changed the significance of constitu-
tional violations so that these violations become permissible with the right
excuse.
The Court's parable allowed bold and creative members of the Depart-
ment of Justice to imagine the USA PATRIOT Act. Without the Court's nar-
rative transformation of the exclusionary rule from remedial measure to deter-
rent device, the justifications offered in the Act for ignoring constitutional
limitations would have been cognitively untenable. The Act was not a neces-
sary response to September 1 th but rather a crystallization of a long history
of judicial storytelling, of interbranch locution, which was merely precipi-
tated by that catastrophic event.
What is equally troubling about the Act is its myriad provisions that
simply do away with clear limitations on law enforcement conduct previously
imposed under even the most generous (generous, that is, to law enforce-
ment's desire for flexibility and freedom from accountability) formulation of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. While many scholars have detailed the ways in
which the USA PATRIOT Act does or does not fit within our existing consti-
tutional framework, here's the real news: it was the shift from norms of rem-
edy to norms of deterrence in the suppression of evidence-as much if not
more than the September 1 th attacks-that precipitated this aggressive move
away from core constitutional norms and values.
While the events of September 11 th and the fears they generated were
certainly a catalyst for the Act, it is important to realize that the Act could not
have been pushed through Congress had the Court not first forgotten why we
exclude evidence in the first place. Thus, the rationale for the exclusionary
rule played an equally important part in producing the Act because it pro-
vided a value framework whereby such expansive executive powers could
appear more palatable.
Of course, I realize that I have gone beyond just my microthesis that our
jurisprudence on exclusion has lost sight of the only legitimate understanding
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of Fourth Amendment strictures. I am instead considering determinations of
probable cause and the issuance of warrants under federal statutory rather
than Fourth Amendment guidelines. But these seemingly mundane matters
are central to my macrothesis that the narrative articulated by the Court-
shifting from the bad actor/bad act model to the good faith actor/permissible
act model-has driven our legal system's concept of what constitutes accept-
able police behavior. It is this narrative reformation that led to an Act that is
facially inconsistent with the language and interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. This observation leads one to question whether the September
11 th terrorist attacks were used by an opportunistic legislature bent on repeal-
ing the freedoms guaranteed by the Founders. A brief review of several par-
ticularly troubling aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act, admittedly limited to
those derived under a Fourth Amendment rubric, are prefatory to exploring
the relationship between the old constitutional limits on, and such new statu-
tory grants of, government power.
II. THE USA PATRIOT ACT:
OLD LIMITS AND NEW VISIONS OF POLICE POWER
A. Setting the Stage for Change
Immediately after the horrendous loss of life suffered on September 11,
2001, the federal government undertook a broad effort to expand the scope of
its law enforcement authority over inhabitants of this nation, and arguably of
any nation, who might find themselves implicated within the murky ambit of
the country's "national security interests." '1 5 Just one week after the attacks
in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, Congress encouraged the
President to protect against "acts of international terrorism against the United
States" by using "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons [that] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such or-
ganizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or per-
116 16sons." That same day the President gladly accepted this responsibility. 7
115. The Supreme Court recognized the "inherent vagueness of the domestic
security concept" as part of the basis for rejecting President Nixon's bid to expand the
executive power to conduct warrantless wiretaps in pursuit of national security inter-
ests. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320
(1972).
116. S.J. Res. 23, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
117. See Press Release, White House, President Signs Authorization for Use of
Military Force Bill (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/rel
eases/2001/09/20010918-10.html. In signing Senate Joint Resolution 23, the President
declared that "[t]hose who plan, authorize, commit, or aid terrorist attacks against the
United States and its interests-including those who harbor terrorists-threaten the
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In the weeks that followed the attacks, President Bush's first order of
business was to turn the tables on Congress, as he and the Department of Jus-
tice demanded that they pass legislation that would "provide law enforcement
with the tools necessary to identify, dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorist
organizations before they strike again. ' 1 Not only did the President and
Attorney General demand new law enforcement tools to cope with what they
described as a new and unprecedented threat against the United States, they
demanded action by a fantastically short, and clearly inadequate, deadline.
1 19
With insufficient time to read, 120 much less properly analyze,' 2 1 the Depart-
ment of Justice's hastily drafted piece of legislation, Congress nonetheless
passed the 342 page Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act 122 on October 25, 2001-a mere six weeks after the attacks.
Even before the attacks, there had been a movement afoot among a fac-
tion of federal lawmakers and officials seeking to repeal some, if not many,
of the modest Fourth Amendment gains that had been made during the 1960s
national security of the United States," and that "Senate Joint Resolution 23 recog-
nizes the seriousness of the terrorist threat to our Nation and the authority of the
President under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism
against the United States." Id.
118. See Hearing on Administration 's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement made during tes-
timony of United States Attorney General John Ashcroft) [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism
Hearing].
119. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10,989, S11,020 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (state-
ment of Sen. Feingold) (discussing Attorney General Ashcroft's directive that his new
legislation be "enact[ed] by the end of the week" even though "[t]hat was plainly
impossible").
120. The ungainly speed with which the Act moved through Congress was largely
a response to the administration's cajoling. See Anti-Terrorism Hearing, supra note
118 (informing Congress that "American people do not have the luxury of unlimited
time in erecting the necessary defenses to future terrorist acts"). See also Homeland
Defense: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft) ("Until Congress [passes] these
changes, we are fighting an unnecessarily uphill battle [by] sending our troops into
the modem field of battle with antique weapons.").
121. The Act was passed with severely limited exposure to hearings or public
debate, was not referred to a Congressional conference or committee for evaluation,
and was presented without a conference or committee report to guide the votes of
lawmakers. NANCY CHANG, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE USA PATRIOT
ACT: WHAT'S SO PATRIOTIC ABOUT TRAMPLING ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS? (Nov.
2001), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/USAPATRIOT ACT.pdf.
Nevertheless, the Act passed by overwhelming margins in both the House of Repre-
sentatives (by a margin of 357 to 66) and the Senate (by a margin of 98 to one). 147
CONG. REC. H7224 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001); 147 CONG. REC. D1053 (daily ed. Oct.
25, 2001).
122. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
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and 70s. However, institutional resistance thwarted most early attempts to
redefine American criminal procedure,123 even while the vision of an increas-
ingly militarized police force was steadily being realized. 124 As suggested by
members of the current administration's cabinet, America was not ready for a
change in the balance of civil liberties, akin to those that occurred after the
United States' entry into World War II, because this generation of Americans
had not yet experienced a "catastrophic and catalyzing event-like a new
Pearl Harbor,"'' 25 and were thus unprepared to give up their constitutional
freedoms.
But the national political climate changed drastically after September
1lth and Congress could no longer resist the internal pressure to grant law
enforcement agencies additional powers and control over the conduct of per-
sons within our borders. 26 The September 11 th attacks struck at the heart ofthis country's sense of security and, -like Pearl Harbor, gave the government
123. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); United States v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. Of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (rejecting at-
tempt to expand foreign surveillance powers and exercise those powers against targets
of domestic criminal suspicion). But see, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-
11 (2000)) ("FISA").
124. An effort to better equip, and more heavily arm, local and federal law en-
forcement agencies was a parallel initiative that was designed to alter the balance of
power between law enforcement actors and members of the populace. For a helpful
survey of the history, and a thoughtful critique, of the paramilitary police model,
ultimately suggesting it is incompatible with civilian law enforcement's central
peacekeeping role, see Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward
a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383 (2003).
125. THOMAS DONNELLY, PROJECT FOR THE NEW AM. CENTURY, REBUILDING
AMERICA'S DEFENSES: STRATEGY, FORCES AND RESOURCES FOR A NEW CENTURY 51
(Sept. 2000). Almost exactly twelve months later, enemies used a coordinated air-
borne attack to strike unsuspecting and largely defenseless targets on American soil. It
seems as though our Pearl Harbor has conveniently occurred. See also Eric L. Muller,
12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 571
(2002) (comparing the two attacks on the United States, both in terms of the severity
of the violence, as well as the severity of the government's responsive curtailing of
constitutional freedoms).
126. Problems posed by the drastic augmentation in the government's power to
conduct foreign operations as authorized by the Senate Joint Resolution, and the ad-
ministration's willingness to act unilaterally in the face of a clear international con-
sensus refusing support, clear as they may be, are beyond the scope of this Article.
For an interesting approach to the question of American military unilateralism and
the possible legal significance of our foreign military endeavors post-September 11 th,
see Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: He-
gemony or Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691 (2004); Henry J. Richardson, US.
Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding United Nations Security Council Resolution
1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27 (2003). Cf. Scheherazade S. Rehman,
American Hegemony: If Not Us, Then Who?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 407 (2004).
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an excuse to repeal freedoms as a means of protecting them. The time was
ripe for the Department of Justice to introduce and demand passage of a
sweeping set of changes to what domestic law enforcement agencies would
be empowered to do in the "war on terror," and Congress dutifully responded
by granting its knee-jerk consent. On October 26, 2001, the PATRIOT Act
was signed into law by President Bush, thereby ushering in a new phase in
the extended ebb of constitutional limits on police power. The enhanced law
enforcement powers provided for in the Act may pose a direct threat to the
civil liberties of every person within the United States' jurisdiction.
127
B. A Sampler's Platter of Constitutional Distortion
From the outset, the Act purports to permit law enforcement conduct
that would routinely be recognized by courts as patently violating well estab-
lished Fourth Amendment law.' 28 Although the following survey is not ex-
127. See, e.g., ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: THE FBI'S POWER TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND
PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITHOUT TELLING You (July 2003); CHANG, supra note 121.
Not surprisingly, there are those who are neither troubled by the apparent conflict
between the government's legislative response to September 1 1th and the body of
Constitutional and decisional law preserving individual civil liberties, nor convinced
that such conflicts are always to be avoided. Indeed, some have suggested that
"[t]here may be circumstances when it would be appropriate to go outside the legal
order, at times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional dictates, when re-
sponding to emergency situations." Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1134 (2004) (pro-
posing a generalized, but narrow-defined "Extra-Legal Measures" model of analyzing
official responses to extraordinary events like the 2001 terrorist attacks). Others have
suggested that the public engage in a more explicit surrender of certain civil liberties
in order to increase law enforcement authority and freedom to investigate, as long as
it is in exchange for a complimentary enhancement in other aspects of individual
privacy and liberty. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE
L.J. 2137 (2002) (touting the value of a "grand trade" in which individual liberties
under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments should fluctuate with crime rather than
being construed as fixed and immutable). Even prior to the recent terrorist attacks,
there have been suggestions that the Fourth Amendment should generally be a malle-
able standard that does not provide strict guidelines, but rather may be more of an
esthetic which produces rules by comparing the offensiveness of the alleged criminal
conduct to the offensiveness of the challenged law enforcement misconduct. See Yale
Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987).
128. The Act is also written in such a way as to offend equally deep-rooted no-
tions of liberty protected by the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, among others. For some insight into the
potential for constitutional violations in other areas of criminal and constitutional law,
see, for example, Susan Dente Ross, Secrecy's Assault on the Constitutional Right to
Open Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 351 (2004) (dealing with both First and Sixth
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haustive, these examples were chosen because they illustrate both the depth
of the changes enacted and their stark contrast to previous limits announced
by the United States Supreme Court. To the extent that any court would find
itself constrained to exclude evidence offered at trial on the grounds that it
was unlawfully obtained, the Act constitutes a sea change by drastically nar-
rowing the scope of "unlawful" police behavior. 129 What follows is 'a before-
and-after analysis of three different aspects of law enforcement activity that
would have received vastly different treatment under Fourth Amendment
standards than the Act's new law enforcement guidelines. My purpose in this
discussion is to demonstrate how the Act is a product of interbranch locution,
and a reflection of the narrative value movement away from the remedial
bases for exclusion towards a deterrence-based model.
i. The Role of Probable Cause in
Justifying Intrusions into Protected Spheres
The question of whether a Fourth Amendment violation will lead to the
exclusion of evidence has never been as clear a question as when probable
Amendment issues); Catalina Joos Vergara, Trading Liberty for Security in the Wake
of September Eleventh: Congress' Expansion of Preventive Detention for Non-
citizens, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J 115 (2002) (focusing on Section 412 of the Act and the
Fifth Amendment Due Process concerns it raises); Lindsay N. Kendrick, Comment,
Alienable Rights and Unalienable Wrongs: Fighting the "War on Terror" Through
the Fourth Amendment, 47 How. L.J. 989 (2004) (discussing the potential for racial
profiling under the USA PATRIOT Act and the Equal Protection issues that would
thereby arise); Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Per-
mit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of "In-
telligence" Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1651 (2002) (discussing the Act in
context of conflicts with First Amendment); Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Uncon-
stitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1419 (2003) (focusing on Section 412 of the Act and the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process concerns it raises).
129. Without presuming that the PATRIOT Act is an invalid congressional en-
actment, even in light of the ways in which it squarely conflicts with well established
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment precedent, a court would be hard pressed to deny
that aggressive law enforcement tactics consistent with the PATRIOT Act's relaxed
standards lacked any basis in law.
This presents yet another legal anomaly that merits judicial and scholarly atten-
tion, and sets up a possible Supremacy Clause fight. To what extent can the Depart-
ment of Justice's package of legal reforms give new meaning to judicially-announced
standards of constitutional origin? Beginning with decisions as ancient as Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and running up through a less activist Court's pro-
nouncement in Flores v. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the judiciary has al-
ways been, and continues to be, the final arbiter of the meaning of the supreme law of
the land. If that doctrine carries any force, it should operate to provide positive limits




cause must be shown to support a search or seizure. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that any interference with liberty amounting to a search or
seizure 130 must be justified by the existence of objectively verifiable, indi-
vidualized probable cause, i.e. evidence that would warrant a person of rea-
sonable caution in the belief that criminal activity has been or is about to be
committed. 131 This requirement of probable cause is understood to be instru-
mental to the Fourth Amendment's general guarantee that individuals will be
free from unreasonable government intrusions into their sphere of protected
liberty.
Before. passage of the PATRIOT Act, the only exception to the require-
ment that a search or seizure be justified by probable cause (and that it ordi-
narily be conducted pursuant to a judicially-approved search warrant stating
with particularity the places to be searched or the things to be seized) was
made for government agents investigating threats to national security. Under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
was permitted to engage in secret surveillance without demonstrating indi-
vidualized probable cause for suspecting the target of its investigation of
criminal conduct, but only upon a senior agency official's sworn certification
that "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion." ' 32 This concession was made in order to fully honor the executive
branch's pressing need to preserve the nation's security, but it was made with
the express proviso that any investigation undertaken for the purpose of
criminal law enforcement must always be subject to the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment.
The PATRIOT Act flies in the face of this accepted constitutional wis-
dom by lowering the standard of suspicion necessary to justify official intru-
sions. Concomitantly, it alters the balance of power between the individual
and the state by altering the aspects of FISA that govern the use of search and
seizure powers for foreign intelligence and national security purposes. Sec-
tion 218 of the Act amends FISA to no longer require certification that the
collection of foreign intelligence information is "the purpose" of the surveil-
130. These sorts of intrusions are to be carefully distinguished from law enforce-
ment or other official conduct that falls short of a "full blown" Fourth Amendment
event. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (distinguishing a full blown
"search" or "seizure," which require probable cause, from a less intrusive "stop and
frisk," and declaring the latter to be justified by the less rigorous "articulable suspi-
cion" standard); Camara v. Municipal Court, 381 U.S. 523 (1967) (distinguishing a
"search" or "seizure" undertaken for criminal purposes from those undertaken for
non-penal administrative purposes, and declaring probable cause unnecessary in the
latter scenario based on the assumption that administrative searches were both less
intrusive and less odious than their criminal analogs).
131. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
132. See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2000), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 1804
(Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
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lance.133 Instead it allows the use of FISA warrants that are not supported by
any showing of probable cause in any case where an investigating official is
willing to state that the collection of foreign intelligence information is a
"significant purpose" of an investigation. 134 This is so even if the investiga-
tion is, in fact, primarily or almost exclusively designed for the collection of
ordinary criminal evidence, and thus would otherwise be governed by the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard.
Similarly, pre-PATRIOT Act FISA guidelines authorized issuance of a
court order permitting access to and seizure of records held by third parties
not suspected of criminal activity so long as there were "specific and articu-
lable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records per-
tain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."' 135 Section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act inflates this power far beyond its original scope by authorizing
the government to compel any entity, including any person or business, to
produce "any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents
and other items)" the government might want to examine.' 36 In a circular
effort to insulate these requests for secret access to records from judicial scru-
tiny, Section 215 of the Act requires a judge considering a request under this
provision to grant the application so long as "the application meets the re-
quirements of the section. ' 37 Most significantly, Section 215 does not carry
the former FISA restriction that there be "specific and articulable facts" sug-
gesting that the target of these investigative techniques is an agent of a for-
eign power, otherwise involved in terrorist activity, or even marginally sus-
pected of any criminal activity at all. Section 215 of the Act thus grants far
greater power to invade private space than traditional understandings of the
Fourth Amendment could tolerate, effectively permitting access to private
records and information which is limited only by the discretion and judgment
of an investigative agent for the executive branch. This is achieved not just by
bypassing the review of a neutral and detached magistrate but also by ex-
pressly permitting intrusions under circumstances that could never receive the
sanction of that neutral and detached magistrate in the first instance.
133. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, sec. 218, § 1804(a)(7)(B), 115 Stat. 272, 291.
134. Id.
135. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp.
2001). This FISA provision was expressly limited to records held by "a common
carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental
facility." 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2000), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. 2001).
The Act expands this FISA-based power to include any person or business possessing
"tangible things." 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (Supp. 2001).
136. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, sec. 215, § 1862, 115 Stat. 272, 287.
137. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 288.
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ii. The Proper Method for Executing Judicially-approved Warrants
The Fourth Amendment's restriction on unreasonable intrusions into an
individual's protected sphere of liberty also regulates the manner in which
search warrants may be executed. Under traditional law enforcement prac-
tices and well established Fourth Amendment principles, law enforcement
officers are required to notify the person whose property is to be, or has been,
searched. In addition, before entering the premises officers are required to
announce their presence and state his purpose for being there.1 38 This simple
concept of notifying an individual that their rights would be compromised
came to be known as the "knock and announce" rule,' 39 and it was designed
to serve at least two distinct purposes. First, the rule was premised on the
notion that every deprivation of constitutionally secured rights or interests
must be done with due process of law, which at a minimum requires notice of
the deprivation and an opportunity to challenge official conduct. 140 For re-
lated reasons, the knock and announce rule was also designed to provide an
interested observer an opportunity to supervise the search of the premises in
order to raise subsequent challenges to its scope and any resulting seizures.
Considered as a whole, the knock and announce rule was understood to pro-
vide important protections against official overreaching and a measure of
138. Limited exceptions to this practice, so-called "no-knock warrants," are per-
mitted from time to time under practices that vary from one jurisdiction to the next.
However, the prevailing patterns show such no-knock warrants were only to be per-
mitted under circumstances of extreme law enforcement exigency, mostly involving
concerns for officer safety or the destruction of evidence, and were acceptable only
upon a showing of need in addition to the warrant secured through the normal appli-
cation process. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995).
139. The knock and announce rule is deeply rooted in Anglo-American common
and statutory law, and may reach as far back as Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194,
195 (K.B. 1603). The United States Supreme Court has held that the common law
knock and announce rules are so deeply embedded that they form part of the reason-
ableness inquiry called for by the Fourth Amendment into the manner of the warrant's
execution. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (discussing the vintage and importance of the
knock and announce rule, and suggesting that it may be traced as far back as 1275).
See also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (emphasizing the constitutional
character of the knock and announce rule in rejecting the state's blanket per se rule
permitting no-knock warrants in all felony narcotics cases).
140. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3), according to which "[t]he officer execut-
ing the warrant must: A) give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for [any] property
taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or
B) leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the
property." See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(4), requiring "[t]he officer executing the
warrant [to] promptly return it-together with a copy of the inventory-to the magis-
trate judge designated on the warrant .... [who] must, on request, give a copy of the




civilian oversight of law enforcement behavior while imposing only minimal
restrictions on legitimate law enforcement practices.
The PATRIOT Act eviscerates any restriction the knock and announce
rule might impose on the execution of judicially approved warrants. First,
Section 213 of the Act permits officials to substantially delay notification of a
person whose property has been searched if it can make one of several de
minimis showings of need.14 1 This includes the power to surreptitiously enter
a given location (by physical or other technological means) and search, in-
spect, or copy documents, or to download and transmit computer files, with-
out ever leaving any notice or trace of the intrusion. According to the Act,
law enforcement functionaries simply no longer need to knock, or provide
notice of their intentions, before they cross the threshold of private property.
Similarly, the Act undermines the very purpose of "announcing" by al-
lowing law enforcement to suppress any indication of the official nature of
the intrusion. Instead of being forced to announce their presence and iden-
tity-which is a clue to the subject of the search that the search has a criminal
investigatory purpose and triggers a meaningful opportunity to supervise-
law enforcement officers are now allowed to "sneak and peek" at our private
materials and affairs without being subject to interested individuals' supervi-
sion or scrutiny. Such sneak and peek warrants wholly displace the knock and
announce standard's central role as a guarantee of reasonableness in the con-
duct of official investigations.
42
iii. The Limits on Law Enforcement Surveillance
of Oral Communications
In pre-PATRIOT Act America, electronic surveillance and the collec-
tion of oral communications (respectively known as wiretapping and eaves-
dropping) by law enforcement agents underwent a thorough process of judi-
141. See USA PATRIOT Act, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 286 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2705(a)(2)(a)-(f) (Supp. 2002)) (permitting delayed notification if the government can
show that immediate notice will 1) endanger a person's physical safety; 2) increase
the risk of flight from prosecution; 3) cause evidence to be destroyed or tampered
with; 4) create the potential for witness intimidation; or 5) jeopardize the investigation
or unduly delay trial). The Act also permits a court to continue delay of notification
upon good cause shown. Id. § 213, 115 Stat. at 286 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a
(Supp. 2002)).
It should be noted that every one of the bases recognized by the Act as legitimate
grounds to disregard the Fourth Amendment's knock and announce requirements are
routine concerns in any criminal investigation, and that § 213 is not limited to terror-
ism investigations, but purports to apply to all criminal investigations generally. Thus,
through § 213 of the Act, the Department of Justice gave itself the very powers the
Court has routinely denied to it and all agents of the law enforcement machine.
142. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.
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cial, executive, and legislative evaluation and refinement. 43 This process
culminated in the recognition that even intangible items such as oral commu-
nications were embraced by the Fourth Amendment's privacy guarantees.
Any non-consensual interception of these private communications, however
transmitted, were searches within the meaning of the Constitution requiring
advance approval by a neutral magistrate. 44 In those limited situations where
the investigation was necessary to preserve national security, FISA provided
a mechanism for the Attorney General to secure permission to engage in se-
cret surveillance without probable cause upon certification that the target of
the secret surveillance was an agent of a foreign power or engaged in interna-
tional terrorist activities.
Once again, Section 214 of the PATRIOT Act amends FISA so that this
latter certification is no longer required. The application for enhanced author-
ity to intercept oral or electronic communications must still declare that "the
information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information" or that
the information is "relevant to an ongoing investigation,"'145 but the Act con-
tains no mechanism for evaluating the level of suspicion regarding the target.
Thus there is no mechanism for evaluating the validity of the proposed intru-
sion in light of the Fourth Amendment's privacy concerns and guarantees of
reasonableness in the search and seizure context.
Indeed, Section 216 of the Act requires a court to enter an order merely
upon application by an attorney for the government.' 46 It directs the judge to
authorize installation of surveillance devices (interfering with all manner of
143. Cf Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48
Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)); Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (2000)); and Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
144. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
145. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, sec. 214, § 1842, 115 Stat. 272, 286 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (Supp. 2004)).
146. For those paying close attention, this should certainly raise concerns under
the Separation of Powers doctrine because it appears that the Act expressly limits an
Article III tribunal's authority and ability to render a decision in a pending case. To
the extent that the Act constitutes a restriction on these tribunals' jurisdictional power,
it may run afoul of both the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Article III itself by
redefining the scope of judicial independence. See United States v. Robertson, 45
F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that Separation of Powers Doctrine requires
that the Judiciary and Executive branches stay independent of the other's affairs);
Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examination of Presi-
dent Bush's New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 455 (2002)
(discussing provisions of the Patriot Act that represent compromises in the integrity of
the Separation of Powers Doctrine).
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wire or electronic communications)147 anywhere in the country if "the attor-
ney for the government has certified to the court that the information likely to
be obtained .. . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. ' ,14 This
transforms FISA's limited concession to the needs of national security into an
end run around the Fourth Amendment. The Act disregards the role of the
neutral and detached magistrate as a layer of protection ensuring adequate
consideration of both the needs of law enforcement and the rights and privi-
leges reserved to the individual. It delegates the right to make those determi-
nations to the very government functionary seeking permission to engage in
the constitutional intrusion. But the Fourth Amendment is an expression of
the fundamental (and fundamentally true) premise that officers who are per-
sonally and professionally invested in the criminal investigation can never
exercise the type of balanced and unbiased judgment required by due process.
The whims and desires of the Attorney General cannot supplant the dispas-
sionate and unflinching commitment to fairness that a neutral and detached
magistrate is institutionally situated to honor.
III. TURNING BACK TIME
The PATRIOT Act's expansions of executive authority to intrude upon
the protected spaces of any person or entity are expressly and logically unre-
lated to the core purpose of preserving national security. Not only are the
legitimate national security demands on officers deemphasized in the process
of justifying any given intrusion, but ordinary criminal law enforcement ob-
jectives are elevated to matters of national security.
How could we have reached such a state where the executive can lead
Congress by the nose into reversing decades, if not centuries, of painfully
learned Fourth Amendment wisdom? In view of the long history of executive
branch attempts to liberate itself from the strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment, Congress's explicit refusal to limit the PATRIOT Act to matters of
international terrorism or national security shows that September 11 th simply
made these reversals politically possible and legislatively convenient, but not
necessary. Yet this should come as no surprise to those watching the Court's
migration over time from a robust remedial theory of exclusion to the modem
deterrence-based rationale.
In the preceding Parts, I endeavored to show how the PATRIOT Act
embodies nothing less than a wholesale revision of the Fourth Amendment.
147. Not everyone is convinced, of course, that the Patriot Act is constitutionally
problematic in general, see supra note 127, or that the ways in which the Act defines
government authority to collect oral and electronic communications represents a sig-
nificant expansion over previous regulatory regimes. See Orrin S. Kerr, Internet Sur-
veillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 607 (2003).
148. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, sec. 216, § 3123, 115 Stat. 272, 288-89 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (Supp. 2001)).
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This final Part raises two additional questions: first, what's wrong with such a
revision? Second, if there really is a problem, what is to be done about it?
As an initial matter, it appears that the USA PATRIOT Act is funda-
mentally premised on the notion that the lurking threat of terrorism is conduct
sui generis, and that our existing body of law-as opposed to law enforce-
ment strategies, methods, and techniques-was inadequate to the task of pre-
dicting, preventing, investigating, and punishing like conduct. Implicit in this
position is the notion that the attacks of Semptember 11, 2001, represent a
new form of illegal conduct, certainly not civil, and possibly "super-
criminal," such that existing notions of criminal justice and procedure were
instantly rendered obsolete.
But state and federal laws already on the books punish with all due se-
verity the criminal attacks in Washington and New York. In fact, the
PATRIOT Act frequently makes use of existing definitions of crime to ex-
pand executive power rather than creating new classes of crime to close the
loopholes through which the terrorists might have jumped. 49 The criminal
conduct allegedly justifying passage of the PATRIOT Act was clearly within
the investigative powers previously authorized under FISA.
A related assumption-which has been given voice by more than one
elected official towing the Department of Justice's party line-is that the civil
liberties enjoyed by the American public prior to September 1 th, and the
right to political dissent they are designed to protect, were somehow to blame
for the failures of the intelligence and law enforcement communities. It was
fashionable immediately after the attacks to despise anyone voicing opposi-
tion to a united militaristic response, and to label civil libertarians as na'ive,
unpatriotic or, worst of all, terrorist sympathizers. It is perhaps enough, if not
too clichr, to point out that a long line of patriots and American visionaries,
stretching back to James Madison, emphasized the duty of dissent and over-
sight of government as one of the foremost duties of responsible citizen-
ship. 150
149. The Act does potentially criminalize previously unregulated conduct, such as
by creating new definitions of domestic terrorism; however, these expansions in the
scope of criminal law, as opposed to expansions in law enforcement freedom, are not
clearly responsive to the type of attacks the country suffered. See, e.g., USA
PATRIOT Act, §802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2331(5) (Supp.
2004)) (defining the term "domestic terrorism" as activities that: "A) involve acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any state; B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian popula-
tion; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii)
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnap-
ping; and C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("[T]he private interest of every
individual may be a sentinal over the public rights."). Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (Robert
A. Rutland et al., eds. 1973) ("it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the
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If these two assumptions are indefensible-if neither a failing in our
criminal laws nor the expression of political dissent caused the attacks-then
the easy answer is to reject the policies to which they lead and press for the
PATRIOT Act's repeal. There are hints that political opinion across the coun-
try is turning against the excesses of the Act,' 5 1 and that members of Con-
gress (out of regret or in response to personal or popular opposition) are be-
ginning a movement in that direction. But there is a larger, more immediate
problem that needs attention.
Even if the Act is chipped and cut away, it is likely to reappear in other
guises with the next threat to our national security unless the Supreme Court
changes its narrative patterns. For the PATRIOT Act could only exist if we
accept that some violations of the Constitution are acceptable or even desir-
able. My concern is that deterrence-based theories of exclusion produce dis-
respect for constitutional values, as evidenced by the Act, and are inadequate
to the exclusionary rule's true task of preserving the Fourth Amendment's
liberty guarantee, even for those accused of criminal conduct. Imagine those
situations in which law enforcement officers have no interest in using the
fruits of their Fourth Amendment violation in court-of what value is the
fundamental right then? And of what significance is deterrence? Given that
the purpose of the exclusionary rule is instrumental, by the Court's own rea-
soning, to effectuate the language of the Fourth Amendment, deterrence theo-
ries are not up to the task. Although distortion and misapplication of prece-
dent were certainly the means used by the Court to migrate from remedy to
deterrence, that migration is misguided for the additional reason that its deter-
rence-centeredness is the wrong motivational principle. Instead, the only the-
ory that actually serves the spirit and purposes of the Fourth Amendment is
the remedial theory, and restoration of the remedial theory to its former posi-
tion as a standard for judicial suppression of evidence would have several
desirable consequences.
noblest characteristics of the late Revolution."); Government, NAT'L GAZETTE, Dec.
31, 1791, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 178, 179 (Robert A. Rutland et al.,
eds 1973) ("[E]very good citizen will be at once a centinel over the rights of the peo-
ple; over the authorities of the confederal government; and over both the rights and
the authorities of the intermediate governments."); Charters, NAT'L GAZETTE, Jan.
18, 1792, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 191, 192 ("Liberty and
order will never be perfectly safe, until a trespass on the constitutional provisions for
either, shall be felt with the same keenness that resents an invasion of the dearest
rights; until every citizen shall be an Argus to espy, and and Aegeon to avenge, the
unhallowed deed.").
151. This trend may be best represented by the 379 municipalities (across forty-
three states), and six states as a whole, that have passed anti-Patriot Act resolutions
rejecting the federal government's assertions of necessity and reaffirming their sepa-
rate commitment to preserving civil liberties. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, Main
Street America Fights Back, available at www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFreeMai
n.cfm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005) ("These communities represent approximately 57
million people who oppose sections of the USA PATRIOT Act.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a simple but far-reaching modification of the exclu-
sionary rule, stated as follows: if there has been an intrusion into the sphere of
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, and if that intrusion leads to the
discovery of inculpatory evidence, then the harm occasioned by that intrusion
must be remedied by suppression of the evidence unlawfully collected. This
may sound too much like a but-for rule to some, but it is, in fact, sufficiently
flexible for practical application because the various doctrinal exceptions to the
exclusionary rule-such as the doctrines of hot pursuit or exigent circum-
stances-make the first element of this new standard sensitive to law enforce-
ment realities.
The restoration of a remedial theory of exclusion would not have unduly
drastic effects on trial courts or routine details of trial administration. The main
difference would be that the exclusionary rule would no longer be divorced
from its constitutional basis. This newly reoriented standard would feel familiar
enough to courts that they would have no problem with its implementation,
particularly given that the rules of evidentiary admissibility, namely standards
of relevance and probative value, will not markedly change.
Why would that restoration be a good thing? First, this perspective is
wholly in line with the precedent that spawned the exclusionary rule. Beginning
with the Boyd case, and carrying through Adams to Weeks, the earliest interpre-
tations of the Fourth Amendment's purpose reflect a deep concern for the rights
it secures for the individual vis-A-vis the government. It may, in fact, be more
faithful to the Fourth Amendment for courts to focus on preserving the Fourth
Amendment sphere of privacy inviolate. The only way to preserve that sanctity
ex post an incursion by law enforcement is to exclude any derived evidence
such that the citizen (or non-citizen, as the case may be) sits in as good a posi-
tion at trial as she would have had the law enforcement officers played by the
book.
Second, a remedy-centered exclusionary rule would write out of the law
the strange magistrate judge's error exception, and rein in the other good faith
exceptions that compromise the Amendment's protections. Again, because
courts will currently not suppress evidence gathered by law enforcement offi-
cers in good.faith, even if the magistrate judge or civilian clerk erred in issuing
that warrant, there is a fundamental disconnect between the obvious purpose of
the Fourth Amendment and its effects. It is intolerable to find a component of
our Bill of Rights reduced to such window dressing.
However, if courts were driven to suppress evidence "in exchange for" a
violation of that defendant's constitutional rights, the good faith exceptions
would lose the one hobbled leg they now stand on. There would be no basis or
need for such exceptions to the exclusionary rule if its function were remedial.
It matters not that suppression will not deter future magistrate carelessness (if
that be the cause), but only that a Fourth Amendment injury needs healing.
Suppression would be the answer if, but only if, a cognizable constitutional
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error had occurred. The magistrate judge exception would fall by the wayside,
and command nary a passing comment on the way out.
More to present needs, restoration of the remedial theory of exclusion
would fatally destroy the logic of the PATRIOT Act. The Act represents the
logical extension of deterrence-based rationales and their related exceptions. It
necessarily proceeds on the notion that, in this modem age, some constitutional
violations are a good thing because they enhance the power of police, and pow-
erful police are necessary in today's society. Especially where fear prevails, the
conception of what law enforcement behavior is desirable will shift with the
political winds. But a faithful application of the remedial theory of exclusion
makes such distortions of logic insignificant. Even for those who are not will-
ing to eternally condemn each and every constitutional violation as a sin against
the order of our nation, remedial theories supply a rule of decision that requires
exclusion without reliance on that value judgment. Indeed, remedial theories
are superior to deterrence-driven models because they shift the focus from the
law enforcement industry, which was virtually non-existent at the time of the
drafting, back to the original focus of the Fourth Amendment and its original
case law-the protection of individual persons from government overreaching,
abuse, and official tyranny.
Finally, and perhaps most subtly, a return to the remedial model would
send a better, healthier, and more committed message to the people. It is impor-
tant to note that most of the Constitution's strictures and protections apply with
equal force to citizens and non-citizens who reside here. That fact raises issues
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth remembering that not everyone
who has an occasion to consider, or even rely on, the U.S. Constitution has the
good pleasure to grow up with it. For those people, their first recourse to the
nation's fundamental protections may involve Fourth Amendment liberties or
lack thereof. Regardless of one's national affiliation, the Constitution serves as
a vehicle through which the government, an unchanging instrument comprised
of ever-changing personalities, communicates or translates its values to the
populace. It is of paramount importance that such communication reflect the
notions of "individual worth and sovereignty" that are inherent in a liberal de-
mocracy. Who can say, with a straight face, that the Bill of Rights expresses
fundamental, inalienable truths if such truths can be dismissed as so much kip-
ple 52 when the trial chips are down? By contrast, an exclusionary rule that
operates whenever necessary to reverse a constitutional wrong suggests that,
even in the face of criminal wrongdoing, the values inherent in the Fourth
Amendment, and indeed the document as a whole, are so surpassingly impor-
tant as to tolerate no incursion, however slight.
Related to this last point is the concept ofjudicial integrity. Although such
a romantic notion seems somewhat outdated in this age, it was an idea that re-
152. PHILIP K. DICK, Do ANDROIDS DREAM OF ELECTRIC SHEEP? 57 (1968) ("Kip-
ple is useless objects, like junk mail or match folders after you use the last match or
gum wrappers or yesterday's homeopape.").
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ceived a lot of judicial attention in the first half of the twentieth century. It was
recognized by the Mapp Court when Justice Clark observed that "nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the character of its own existence."'153 "Our government
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example .... [i]f the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy."' 54 That is the value of judicial integrity-to be the omnipresent
teacher. While such flexible ideals cannot be strict guidelines for the court, an
exclusionary rationale that simultaneously serves judicial integrity and reme-
dies constitutional violations is infinitely more attractive than any rule that cre-
ates an internal tension. Not by accident, the exclusionary rule grew up in the
halo of light cast by this notion of judicial integrity, and restoring the first prin-
ciples to the former will ultimately serve the health and vitality of the latter.
153. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
154. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
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